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I. INTRODUCTION
After a brief hibernation, mega-mergers and corporate acquisitions
have returned with a vengeance. Merger activity has risen dramati-
cally in recent years, with activity increasing at record rates for each
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of the past four consecutive years.' In 1998, mergers and acquisitions
resulted in $2.4 trillion in announced activity.2 The first three
quarters of 1999 outpaced that rate, with $2.2 trillion generated in the
first three quarters alone.3 Unlike the mergers of the 1980s, which
occurred more often as a result of leveraged buyouts of undervalued
companies, the mergers and acquisitions of the 1990s have taken on a
different flavor. Instead of attempting to capitalize on the cash flows
of companies trading below their supposed market values, entities are
uniting to achieve more efficient operations and provide a greater re-
turn as they court potential investors.4 The impetus behind the re-
cent wave of corporate integration is premised on allowing companies
to better compete in the world economy by achieving synergistic and
competitive advantages over rivals.5 By contrast, leveraged-buyout
firms accounted for only 10% of the hostile takeovers since 1994, down
by half since the 1988-89 period.6 Strategic investors, normally those
in a business related to that of the target, initiated the remaining
takeovers. These strategic investors acquire their targets not only to
achieve greater efficiencies in their own companies, but often to obtain
the target company for relatively bargain rates. "[T]he prospect that
strategic investors will produce a more competitive company has
helped bring the 'takeover premium' down to 26% last year from 58%
in 1988."7 Many of the recent mergers in which the acquiring com-
pany made a tender offer for the stock of the target company were
effectuated consensually. Increasingly, such tender offers consist of
the stock of the acquiring company coupled with cash or bonds, rather
1. See A Busy Year in Business, STAR TRmuNE (Minneapolis), Dec. 31, 1998, at 1D.
2. See id.
3. See Why this Merger Wave is Different, Bus. Wi., Oct. 18, 1999, at 234.
4. The volume of acquisitions and mergers in some industries has been spurred by
the view that consolidation will increase efficiencies and expand markets. See,
e.g., William Bulkeley, CVS to Buy Arbor Drugs for $1.48 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 10, 1998, at A3 (drugstores); Peter Elstrom et al., A Cell Phone in Every
Pocket?, Bus. Wic, Jan. 18, 1999, at 38 (telecommunications); Steven Lipin and
Deborah Lohse, AIG to Buy SunAmerica for $18 Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,
1998, at A3 (insurance); Elizabeth MacDonald, Price-Coopers Deal Faces Hurdles
before July Launch, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1998, at B4 (accounting); Stephanie N.
Mehta, WorldCom Quietly Completes MCI Communications Purchase, WALT ST.
J., Sept. 15, 1998, at B6 (telecommunications); Robert O'Brien, News of Wells
Fargo-Norwest Pact Boosts Buying in Financial Shares, WALL ST. J., June 9,
1998, at C4 (banking); Ron Winslow, Aetna to Acquire Prudential Health Unit,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1998, at A3 (health insurance).
5. The current trend towards mergers differs from that of the past, being driven by
forces including a desire to cut costs, shrink capacity, and gain access to new
technologies, skills and workers, as well as to reduce competition and hike prices.
See Why this Merger Wave is Different, supra note 3.
6. See Greg Ip, With Dow 9000 Nearby, Stocks get Boost as Corporate America
Tightens its Belt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1998, at C1.
7. Id.
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than the all-cash tender offers that characterized the era of mergers of
the 1980s.8
However, the collective impact on individual shareholders who
hold stock in a target company is often ignored in the broader context
of business mergers and acquisitions. Notably, when several compa-
nies initially tender offers to shareholders of a target company, the
price of the finite block of stock rises as a result of the competitive
forces attempting to acquire it. This is what is often referred to as the
"market for corporate control."9 When two or more entities vie for a
finite block of stock of a target company, what are the qualitative and
quantitative effects of the collusive transaction between potential buy-
ers which reduce this market from several bidders to one? Specifi-
cally, what are the legal implications and economic effects of an
agreement among potential buyers of stock in which suitors exit the
bidding process in exchange for some sort of compensation thereby
lowering the purchase price necessary to gain control of the corpora-
tion as a result of the diminished competition?iO
The issue is not merely of academic interest, since several recent
mergers have followed this pattern. For example, in a communications
industry battle both Global Crossing and Qwest separately bid to ac-
quire two companies: Frontier and U.S. West. Rather than engage in
a bidding war, the rival suitors agreed to split the prizes, with Global
Crossing getting Frontier while Qwest acquired U.S. West. Global
Crossing received approximately half of an $800 million "breakup fee"
in relation to the U.S. West deal, in exchange for Qwest's promise not
to continue to pursue Frontier.ii In a similar exchange, rival suitors
Bethlehem Steel and Allegheny Teledyne each attempted to acquire
Lukens. Bethlehem succeeded in gaining Lukens only after agreeing
to sell some assets to Allegheny.i 2 Similarly, with both Comcast and
8. For example, see AT&T's acquisition of Teleport Communications in an exchange
of stock. See Steven Lipin, AT&T to buy Teleport for $11.3 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 9, 1998, at A3.
9. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 77 (1987); see also Edward
B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1365
(1989)(examining the role of antitrust laws in protecting the basic competitive
processes within the market for corporate control).
10. Data on the rate of collusive conduct in the market for corporate acquisitions is
difficult to obtain due to the widespread use of confidentially agreements. In
practice, at least with friendly takeovers, target corporations often require that
would-be acquirers agree not to contact other potential acquirers in exchange for
access to non-public information concerning the takeover target. Interview with
C. James Levin, J.D., M.M., O'Melveny & Myers, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Jan. 2,
1994).
11. See Rebecca Blumenstein, Qwest Wins U.S. West for $35 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
July 19, 1999, at A3.
12. See Chris Adams, Bethlehem Steel Wins Bidding War for Lukens, Agrees to Deal
with Rival, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1998, at B6.
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AT&T vying to acquire MediaOne, Comcast agreed to withdraw its
offer after AT&T "gave" its cable systems in Baltimore and Washing-
ton, D.C. to Comcast.1 3 All of these examples involve one acquirer
paying another to refrain from competitive bidding. This behavior,
known as "bid rigging," is normally considered a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.14 But while such cases are routinely prosecuted by the
U.S. Justice Department, there is no history of such treatment in the
market for corporate control.15
Part I of this article will examine the historical evolution of anti-
trust laws, specifically as they have been applied to the market for
corporate control. Part II will examine the current judicial opinions
advanced which reject the application of antitrust laws to the market
for corporate control, including the supposed nonapplicability of anti-
trust laws to the sale of stock and the implied revocation of the anti-
trust laws by virtue of the enaction of the Williams Act. Part III will
address the inability of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
regulate the market for' corporate control via the Williams Act in that
there is no inherent conflict between the Commission's disclosure re-
quirements and the policy of antitrust laws. Part IV will analyze the
quantitative economic effects of the diminution of competition in the
market for corporate control and examine its aggregate effect on
shareholders.
II. OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS
A review of the development of antitrust law in the context of its
concurrent application to other areas of federal law, especially securi-
ties regulation, provides the requisite foundation to determine
whether the Sherman Act is applicable to the market for corporate
control. The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 to curb the abuses of
unreasonable economic restraints imposed by entities endeavoring to
limit trade through the restriction of competitive conditions.16 Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal."'17
A literal interpretation of the plain language of the Sherman Act
would void all contracts because an agreement by two parties necessa-
13. See Leslie Cauley and Rebecca Blumenstein, Comcast, in AT&T Accord, Aban-
dons MediaOne Bid, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1999, at A3.
14. See United States v. Seville Indus. Mach. Corp., 696 F. Supp. 986, 989 (D.N.J.
1988).
15. See R. Preston McAfee et al., Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers, 2 J. OF
ECON. & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 449, 450 (1993).
16. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
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rily restrains trade by virtue of the contracting parties' exclusionary
agreement.' 8 In order to avoid this unintended result,1 9 courts have
inquired as to whether the restraint of trade "is unreasonably restric-
tive of competitive conditions."20 This "Rule of Reason" test was first
articulated by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil v. United States,2 1
and its application has been relatively unchanged throughout the last
century.2 2 Congress has also chosen to statutorily exempt certain in-
dustries from antitrust liability even though their participants may
form agreements and combinations that would otherwise unreasona-
bly restrain trade. 23 An unreasonable restraint of trade may be found
when either the contract itself or the surrounding circumstances "give
rise to the inference or presumption that they had been entered into
... with the intent to do wrong... and to limit the right of individuals,
thus restraining the free flow of commerce and tending to bring about
18. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Justice
Brandeis tempered the Court's analysis of the scope of antitrust laws by noting
that "every agreement, concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence..." Id. See also United States v. Topco
Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972)(noting that a literal reading of the Sherman Act
would preclude enforcement of all contracts).
19. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 606. "The history underlying the formulation of the anti-
trust laws led this Court to conclude, however, that Congress did not intend to
prohibit all contracts. .. ." Id.
20. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). It is this concept that com-
prises the essence of antitrust law enforcement. Prior to the enaction of the Sher-
man Act, many courts focused on whether the agreed price between two
contracting parties itself was reasonable. See id. The Supreme Court explicitly
rejected this type ofjudicial analysis because it fails to focus on the agreement's
restraining effect on competition. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 330-39 (1897); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
175 U.S. 211, 238 (1899).
21. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
22. Standard Oil also removed the consideration of factors affecting a particular in-
dustry from the judicial analysis of whether an agreement violated the Sherman
Act. Id. at 65. The Sherman Act does not confer courts the authority to exempt a
particular industry or arrangement because of possible beneficial effects of a pro-
posed transaction notwithstanding the fact that it would otherwise have consti-
tuted an unreasonable restraint of trade. See id. at 65. The Court was
apparently concerned that lower courts might have been inclined to carve out
exceptions to the preclusive effect of antitrust laws absent Congressional legisla-
tion. See id.
23. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1013 (1995)(exempting certain insurance agreements
from the preclusive effect of the Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1995)(exempt-
ing newspaper agreement from antitrust laws). One of the most famous antitrust
exemptions that has not been statutorily accepted is that of professional baseball.
See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Through the twentieth century, baseball
has enjoyed the relatively unfettered ability to administer regulations including
the geographic placement of professional baseball teams in a given area. See id.
at 283. The Supreme Court was unwilling to abrogate baseball's non-statutory
exemption from antitrust enforcement absent legislative action from Congress.
See id.
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*.. enhancement of prices."24 If the agreement is so plainly anticom-
petitive on its face that no further analysis of the particular industry
is needed to ascertain the contract's illegality, it fails the first test of
the Rule of Reason and is illegalper se.25 If the anticompetitive effects
of the agreement are discerned only through an analysis of the circum-
stances unique to the particular business or industry, the history of
the restraint and reasons underlying its imposition, the agreement
fails the second test of the Rule of Reason and thus violates the Sher-
man Act.26 The Court developed this test with the belief that the re-
straint of trade would shackle free competition and eventually force
an increase in prices, which contravened the public policy advanced by
the Sherman Act.2 7 Thus, the test for whether an agreement violates
antitrust laws focuses on whether the restraint of trade is simply sub-
sumed within and fosters competition, or whether it suppresses and
24. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58. The Court fashioned this test based on its interpre-
tation of the legislative intent and the public policy goal intended to be furthered
through the enaction of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act was not particularly
clear on defining the circumstances that would constitute an illegal restraint of
trade, so courts have applied the relatively unchanged judicial test promulgated
in Standard Oil. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489
(1940)(noting that exceptions to the Sherman Act "were not stated in terms of
precision or of crystal clarity and the Act itself did not define them. In conse-
quence of the vagueness of its language... the courts should interpret its words
in the light of its legislative history and of the particular evils at which the legis-
lation was aimed."); see also Nat'l Society of Profl Engineers v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) ("In this respect the Rule of Reason has remained faith-
ful to its origins."); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)("[IW]e can see
no reason for reading into the Sherman Act more than we can find there .... ");
Appalachian Coals, Inc., v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933)("As a char-
ter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability comparable
to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.")
25. See Nat'l Society of Profl Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692; see also Apex Hosiery, 310
U.S. at 500 ("In thus grounding the 'rule of reason' upon ... doctrines applicable
to illegal restraints of trade the Court gave a content and meaning to the statute
in harmony with its history and plainly indicated by its legislative purpose.").
26. See Nat'l Society of Profl Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692. The Rule of Reason test is
disjunctive in that an agreement violates antitrust laws if it is either illegal per
se, or illegal by virtue of the circumstances surrounding the restraint. See Stan-
dard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58.
27. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58. The Court appeared to structure the Rule of
Reason test to be consistent with the aims of the Sherman Act. Thus, tbe genesis
of the test came from the Court's analysis that antitrust laws were designed to
prohibit or outlaw all contracts or combinations that unreasonably restricted
competition. See id. An unreasonable restraint of trade could come from the lit-
eral content of the agreement, which is the first manner in which a court could
invalidate an agreement pursuant to the Sherman Act. See id. In addition, a
court also could strike down a contract if the circumstances surrounding the
agreement showed that the parties intended to restrain trade and raise prices,
rather than the "legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest."
Id.
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eviscerates free trade. 28 The Rule of Reason rejects any analysis that
focuses solely on whether the price set by the competitors is reasona-
ble.29 The antitrust laws, after all, were designed to prevent unrea-
sonable restraints of trade, not to set reasonable prices in the
marketplace.30
The jurisprudence interpreting the Sherman Act has been refined
over the past century in the context of its application to alleged anti-
trust violations.3 ' However, the interplay of antitrust laws with other
federal laws and regulations, particularly statutes governing corpo-
rate mergers and acquisitions, has received considerably less
attention.
One of the seminal cases in which the Supreme Court explicitly
addressed the coexistence of the viability of antitrust laws in the con-
text of concurrent federal regulation was Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.32
In Apex Hosiery, the Supreme Court broadly delineated the applica-
tion of the Sherman Act to restraints of trade involving labor unions,
"which are so substantial as to affect market prices."33 In the context
of applying antitrust laws to a labor union governed by the rules of the
National Labor Relations Act, Apex Hosiery expounded that the Sher-
man Act was designed to prevent restraints of trade that either had or
were intended to manipulate prices in the market or would otherwise
deprive purchasers or consumers of the benefits gained through free
competition.34 The thrust of the Supreme Court's analysis was a com-
parison of the respective aims of the National Labor Relations Act and
the Sherman and Clayton Acts.35 The dissent in Apex Hosiery noted
that the National Labor Relations Act was designed to prevent the
28. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
29. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 235-38 (1899).
30. See id. Some arguments advanced in contravention to the Rule of Reason assert
that the Sherman Act is designed to increase competition, and not to prevent
restraints of trade. Relying on Standard Oil's analysis of the rationale underly-
ing the enaction the Sherman Act, "[tihe heart of our national economic policy
long has been faith in the value of competition." Standard Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
31. Even though the Rule of Reason has remained in effect for the better part of the
last century, the Supreme Court has also articulated the standards in which
courts interpret the Rule of Reason. The trier of fact must balance all circum-
stances in a case in deciding whether a restrictive arrangement should be struck
down as an unreasonable restraint of trade. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). Courts need to differentiate whether the
purported restraint "merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Nat'l Society
of Prof l Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978)(quoting Continental T.V. Inc., 433
U.S. at 49 n.15).
32. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
33. Id. at 500.
34. See id. at 493.
35. See id. at 501-13.
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disruption of the shipment and delivery of goods through interstate
commerce.3 6 Thus, the National Labor Relations Act was applied to
situations in which unfair labor practices interrupted or adversely ef-
fected interstate commerce.3 7 The legislative purpose behind the
enaction of the Sherman Act was to curb unreasonable restraints of
trade resulting from illegal contracts, combinations or conspiracies. 38
The Court applied the Sherman Act after concluding that there was no
conflict between the National Labor Relations Act and antitrust
laws.3 9 Apex Hosiery was one of the first and most prominent deci-
sions to delineate the pattern for the Supreme Court's analysis of
whether antitrust laws may be applied in the context of concurrent
federal legislation or regulation. The Apex Hosiery Court expounded a
very broad interpretation of the Sherman Act in concluding that labor
unions were subject to antitrust laws notwithstanding the existence of
the National Labor Relations Act.40
Two decades after Apex Hosiery, the Supreme Court addressed the
applicability of the Sherman Act within the context of mergers in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.41 In Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank, the Supreme Court affirmed the existence of antitrust
laws in the context of the commercial banking industry.4 2 Philadel-
phia National Bank and Girard Trust Bank, the second and third larg-
est banks in Philadelphia, approved a consolidation of the two
entities.43 The Attorney General challenged the consolidation on the
basis that it would have an anticompetitive effect in the Philadelphia
banking region.44 The Court addressed the issue of whether antitrust
laws were applicable in the context of bank mergers. 4 5 The Court
prefaced its analysis by noting the applicability of antitrust laws to
36. See id. at 527 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 527-28 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting); see also National Labor Relations Bd.
v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937)(applying the National Labor Rela-
tions Act to a manufacturer of commercial trailers); National Labor Relations
Bd. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939)(holding that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act has set no restrictions to the volume of interstate commerce that can be
adjudicated by its terms).
38. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 527 (1940)(Hughes, C.J., dissent-
ing)(quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435
(1932)).
39. Apex Hosiery at 528. "It would indeed be anomalous if, while employees are
bound by the Labor Act... at the same time the direct and intentional obstruc-
tion or prevention of such shipments by the employers were not deemed to be a
restraint of interstate commerce under the broad terms of the Sherman Act." Id.
40. See id. at 529. "[The Sherman Act does not except labor unions from its pur-
view.. . ." Id.
41. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
42. See id. at 372.
43. See id. at 330-31.
44. See id. at 333-34.
45. See id. at 323.
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corporate acquisitions of stock and capital due to Congress's concern
that the market of corporate control would lead to monopolistic con-
centrations.4 6 Thus, Congress intended through the enaction of the
Sherman Act, and the subsequent enaction of the Celler-Kefauver An-
timerger Act of 1950, to broaden the reach of antitrust laws to apply to
stock and asset acquisitions. 4 7 Congress had passed the Bank Merger
Act in 1960, yet made no provision that would exempt banks from the
scrutiny of antitrust laws.48 In deciding that banks were subject to
antitrust regulation notwithstanding concurrent legislation promul-
gated in the Bank Merger Act, the Court again focused on and con-
cluded that the application of the Clayton Act would not frustrate or
conflict with the Bank Merger Act.49
Notably, the Court reiterated the rule that "[i]mmunity from the
antitrust laws is not lightly implied" in the context of its application in
the face of concurrent federal regulation.50 The Court reasoned that
had Congress wished to create a special exemption from the reach of
antitrust law for the banking industry, it would have done so through
legislation.5 1 The Court chose to focus on the lack of express intent by
Congress that antitrust laws were not applicable in the arena of bank
mergers.5 2 Instead, the Court articulated the test for whether anti-
trust causes of action were maintainable in the presence of other fed-
eral legislation when Congress is silent as to antitrust exemption.
The Court stated that in the absence of a statutory exemption by Con-
gress, antitrust laws were applicable unless there was a plain repug-
nancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions. 5 3 In
46. See id. at 337-38.
47. See id. at 342. The Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act was Congress' response to
judicial holdings that found that mergers were outside the scope of the Clayton
Act. See, United States v. Celanese Corp. of America, 91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1950); see also Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 291
U.S. 587 (1934)(reasoning that the FTC did not have authority to obtain an order
compelling enforcement with § 11 of the Clayton Act). As a response to the
proliferation of mergers, Congress manifested a clear intent to bring consolida-
tions and mergers within the ambit of antitrust laws. Congressman Celler, co-
sponsor of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, stated that the bill was designed
to "plug a loophole in the present antitrust laws.... It is time to stop, look, and
listen and.., halt.., the merger movement that is going on in this country." 95
CONG. REc. 11,485 (1949). Consequently, Congress amended the Clayton Act to
provide for an assets-acquisition provision to subject mergers to antitrust scru-
tiny. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 340 (1963).
"Congress primarily sought to bring mergers within § 7 and thereby close what it
regarded as a loophole in the section." Id. at 341.
48. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 352.
49. See id. at 354.
50. Id. at 348.
51. See id. at 354.
52. See id. at 350-52. "[T]he legislative history of the Act seems clearly to refute any
suggestion that applicability of the antitrust laws was to be affected." Id. at 352.
53. See id. at 350-51.
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concluding that the merger violated antitrust laws, the Court rea-
soned that free competition operates within the ambit of governmen-
tal regulation of the banking industry, which included enforcing the
anticompetitive remedy provided by antitrust laws, despite the protec-
tions afforded by the industry's stringent regulations.5 4
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT FOR APPLICATION OF
ANTITRUST LAWS TO THE SALE OF STOCK
The application of antitrust laws to the sale of securities has been
shaped by a trio of Supreme Court cases which delineated the applica-
ble test for whether the Sherman and Clayton Acts55 may be applied
concurrently with SEC regulations and securities laws.
The seminal case analyzing the application of antitrust laws to se-
curities regulations is Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.56 The facts
of Silver are relatively straightforward. The New York Stock Ex-
change directed all nonmember users of private wires connected to the
Exchange to discontinue their connection to the Exchange's stock
ticker service.5 7 Silver's firm was not a member of the Exchange, and
was therefore prohibited from using the wire connections to the Ex-
change.SS The Exchange abruptly discontinued the use of private
wires pursuant to its rules, and refused to offer Silver an explanation
for its decision.5 9 Since Silver was no longer able to quickly obtain
stock quotes, his company lost customers stemming from the Ex-
change's decision to cut off all non-members from using private
wires.6 0 Silver's business greatly declined and eventually stopped
functioning as an operating business organization.61 Silver sued the
Exchange for violation of the Sherman Act because the members col-
lectively refused to allow his business to continue using the private
wire connections. 6 2 The Supreme Court analyzed whether the Ex-
change was exempt from antitrust liability as a result of the enaction
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which promulgated self-
regulation of exchanges.6 3
The Court prefaced its analysis by noting that, in the absence of
the Securities and Exchange Act, the Exchange's removal of the wires
would constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act because it was
54. See id. at 372.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1994).
56. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
57. See id. at 343-44.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 344.
60. See id. at 345.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 347.
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concerted effort by the member groups to deprive non-members of the
ability to effectively trade through the market.6 4 Thus, the Ex-
change's refusal to allow non-members access to the private wires ef-
fectively precluded competition and would constitute an unreasonable
restraint of trade.6 5 However, the Court was compelled, given the ex-
istence of SEC regulations, to examine the circumstances surrounding
the restraint of trade and examine the policies, antitrust laws and
SEC regulations in the context of this fact scenario. 6 6
The Court next analyzed whether the Sherman Act could be recon-
ciled with the Securities and Exchange Act, or whether the self-regu-
lation goals of securities regulations necessitated the nonapplicability
of antitrust laws. 67 Thus, the focus of the Court's reasoning is not
whether the self-regulating nature of the Securities and Exchange Act
preempted application of antitrust laws, but rather whether the two
acts could be reconciled and mutually applied.6 S
Notably, the Court clearly articulated that Congress did not ex-
empt the Securities Exchange Act from antitrust laws.6 9 In light of
express exemption from Congress, Silver emphasized the long-stand-
ing principle that implied revocation of antitrust laws to the field of
security regulations are strongly disfavored.70 Silver recognized the
64. See id. at 347. Thus, the Rule of Reason promulgated in Standard Oil would
have prohibited the removal of the wires because it constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade on its face. See 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). See also Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild of Am. Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)(holding that
garment manufacturers violated the Sherman Act by restricting the sale of unre-
gistered textile, notwithstanding regulatory authority of Federal Trade Commis-
sion). Thus, the Court would, under ordinary business circumstances, hold these
types of naked restraints of trade to be unreasonable on a per se basis. However,
the presence of concurrent federal regulation provoked the alternative analysis of
the Rule of Reason test, which focuses on the surrounding facts and circum-
stances of the restraint. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347-49
(1963).
65. See Silver, 373 U.S. at 364. Had the case not involved alternative federal regula-
tion, the Court would have easily found the Board's act to be an unreasonable
restraint of trade. Id. at 347. "The concerted action of the Exchange and its
members here was, in simple terms, a group boycott depriving petitioners of a
valuable service which they needed in order to compete.. . ." Id.
66. See id. at 349.
67. See id. at 349-51.
68. See id. at 360-61.
69. See id. at 357.
70. See id. The doctrine of implied revocation, which would impliedly exempt anti-
trust laws from application in a situation in which it conflicted with Securities
Exchange Act, was promulgated in United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188,
198 (1939). In such cases, repeal of antitrust laws would occur "only if necessary
to make the Securities and Exchange Act work, and even then only then to the
minimum extent necessary." Silver, 373 U.S. at 357. See Borden, 308 U.S. at 198
(1939)(refusing to impliedly repeal the Sherman Act in the context of concurrent
application with federal Agricultural Act); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324
U.S. 439, 457 (1945)(rejecting implicit revocation of Sherman Act by applying an-
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unique interplay between antitrust laws and securities regulations by
noting that "antitrust laws are peculiarly appropriate as a check upon
anticompetitive acts of exchanges." 71 The Court focused on the fact
that Congress empowered the SEC with the regulatory authority to
suggest and disapprove rules promulgated by various exchanges.72
However, the Court opined that the SEC does not maintain the juris-
dictional authority to review enforcement of the rules stated in the
Securities and Exchange Act.73 Thus, the SEC, by virtue of its status
as a regulatory agency, does not have the ability to apply antitrust
laws to an exchange that engages in a unreasonable restraint of
trade.74 Silver noted that antitrust laws played a valid role in the
context of securities regulations by insuring a competitive environ-
ment in the securities industry.75 The Exchange's arbitrary and un-
fettered right to terminate Silver's wire connection, combined with the
SEC's inability to compel the exchange to change its anticompetitive
rules, displayed the need for some sort of review of the anticompetitive
effects of the Exchange's rules. 76 The Court concluded that the Ex-
change had engaged in an unreasonable restraint of trade and failed
to demonstrate how antitrust laws offended the goals of implementing
the self-regulating provisions of the applicable securities laws.77
Silver recognized that a broader application of antitrust laws
served to ensure competitive freedom, even in the area of securities
regulations in which there exist substantive laws and regulations gov-
erning stock transactions.7 8 When antitrust laws do not obstruct the
policy of the Securities and Exchange Act, they are fully applicable in
instances where parties are engaged in unreasonable restraints of
trade. 79 Stated another way, Silver's holding is not confined to
whether securities regulations address a situation to which antitrust
laws may be applicable, but whether there is a direct conflict in apply-
titrust laws to entities regulated by Interstate Commerce Commission); Califor-
nia v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485, 490 (1962)(rejecting implicit
revocation of antitrust laws in context of Federal Power Commission's regulatory
authority).
71. Silver, 373 U.S. at 360 ("Evidence of antitrust violations is plainly relevant in
merger applications... ."); see California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482,
484 (1962)(citing City of Pittsburgh v. Federal Power Comm'n, 237 F.2d 741
(1956)).
72. See Silver, 373 U.S. at 357.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 358-59. The SEC's lack of enforcement power could lead to antitrust
abuses by powerful regional exchanges which engage in unchecked, anticompeti-
tive behavior in the absence of administrative or judicial authority which could
enjoin unreasonable, anticompetitive activity. See id.
75. See id. at 359-60.
76. See id. at 361-62.
77. See id. at 365-67.
78. See id. at 362-63.
79. See id.
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ing antitrust laws to situations which would offend the application of
securities regulations.SO
Silver addressed the issue of the applicability of antitrust laws in
the context of securities regulations when there is no conflict between
the simultaneous application of both laws. The unanswered question
was what situation would constitute a direct conflict between SEC
regulations and antitrust violations. The Supreme Court addressed
that issue twelve years later in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,
Inc.8 1
In Gordon, the petitioner sued several stock exchanges challenging
their agreements to set fixed commission rates as a violation of the
Sherman Act.82 The exchanges argued that the SEC maintained su-
pervisory authority over the disputed activities pursuant to the Secur-
ities and Exchange Act83 and were therefore not subject to the
preclusive effects of antitrust laws.8 4 Pursuant to section 19(b)(9) of
the Securities and Exchange Act, the SEC was given supervisory au-
thority to fix reasonable rates of the various exchanges.8 5 Pursuant to
this statute, the SEC has direct authority to regulate and fix reasona-
ble rates of commission.8 6 Further, the SEC had maintained a history
of actively regulating commission rates established pursuant to its
regulatory power.8 7 In applying the test articulated in Silver, the
Court reasoned that antitrust laws directly conflicted with the SEC's
regulatory authority in this particular instance.8 8 Thus, the Court ap-
plied Silver's standard of antitrust analysis in the context of securities
by stating that the implicit repeal of antitrust laws in the face of po-
tentially conflicting securities laws was appropriate only in cases of
"plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions."8 9
In finding that the relevant SEC regulations on exchange commission
rates could not be reconciled with antitrust laws, the Court reasoned
that subjecting exchanges to antitrust standards, which are designed
to protect competition, may conflict with the SEC's policy of safe-
guarding the economic health of the securities market.90 While the
Court characterized its holding as an exception to the rule promul-
80. See id. at 360-61.
81. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
82. See id. at 660-61.
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1994).
84. See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 661.
85. See id. at 666-67.
86. See id. at 685.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 685-86.
89. Id. at 682 (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-
51 (1963)).
90. See id. at 688-89.
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gated in Silver,9 1 it devoted the majority of its analysis to the active
role that the SEC had taken in making sure that commission rates
were adequately regulated. 92 Thus, just as the Silver Court was
troubled by the SEC's inability to enforce certain exchange rules, the
Gordon Court's holding appeared similarly influenced by the protec-
tions offered to investors by virtue of the SEC's proactive approach
toward establishing commission rates. In both cases, the level of SEC
attention to the perceived anticompetitive problem heavily influenced
the Court's decision to allow or disallow the application of antitrust
laws in the face of concurrent SEC regulation.
Despite its holding, Gordon is significant for the advocation of anti-
trust laws to securities transactions in two respects. First, Gordon
cemented Silver's rule that antitrust laws were applicable in the field
of securities, notwithstanding the regulatory power of the SEC, to the
extent that they are not plainly repugnant toward the SEC's regula-
tory power. Thus, the analysis focuses on whether the two acts con-
tradict rather than merely overlap each other. Even if antitrust laws
are plainly repugnant toward implementation of SEC regulations, an-
titrust laws yield only to the minimal extent necessary to implement
the Securities and Exchange Act. Second, Gordon appreciated that
the determination of whether antitrust laws were plainly repugnant
to SEC regulations was completely dependent on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case.9 3 Thus, rather than articulate narrow
standards for determining which situations were appropriate for the
coexistence of antitrust laws and which situations necessitated their
implied revocation, Gordon affirmed the responsibility of the judici-
ary, and not the administrative agencies, for making these factual de-
terminations. 94 Given the SEC's apparent enforcement power 95 over
this aspect of the Securities and Exchange Act and its long and ardu-
ous history of consistent regulation of exchange commission rates, the
Court seemed less bothered by the possible anticompetitive aspects of
91. See id. at 685. "[The case presently at bar is ... that 'different case' to which the
Court in Silver referred." Gordon, 422 U.S. at 685.
92. See id. The Court noted that the SEC "has been engaged in deep and serious
study of the commission rate practices of the exchanges and of their members,
and has required major changes in those practices." Id. at 690.
93. See id. at 685 (stating that Gordon was a "different case" from the general rule
set forth in Silver).
94. See id. at 686. The decision of whether to allow the regulatory agency to operate
free of antitrust legislation or whether to apply antitrust laws is to be decided by
the courts. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 306-08 (1973).
95. The Court seemed swayed by the fact that the legislative history of section 19(b)
indicated that the SEC could "compel adoption of those changes it felt were neces-
sary to insure fair dealing and protection of the public." Gordon, 422 U.S. at 667.
The Court also seemed satisfied of the SEC's ability to enforce compliance with
its regulation of this rule given its historical performance and activity in this area
over the last 40 years. See id., at 663-91.
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the exchange and felt confident that the SEC could rectify any an-
ticompetitive rate established by an exchange. 96 Gordon left open the
possibility of applying antitrust laws to other issues in which the SEC
has regulatory power, and in fact reiterates Silver's presumptive ap-
plication of antitrust law in situations except when they are plainly
repugnant to SEC regulations.
The third landmark Supreme Court case involving the interplay
between antitrust laws and security regulations occurred in United
States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.9 7 Securities
Dealers was decided in the same year as Gordon and determined
whether mutual fund companies were exempt from antitrust liabil-
ity.98 Like Gordon, a divided Securities Dealers Court had to interpret
the SEC's enforcement power over a provision of the Securities and
Exchange Act.99 Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940
prohibited dealers from selling mutual fund shares to any person ex-
cept another dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer.1 0 0 Much of
the Court's reasoning came from its analysis of the legislative history
and purpose of the Investment Company Act. The Court found that
the statutory language contained in section 22(d) did not exempt bro-
ker-dealers selling mutual funds in the capacity as brokers from anti-
trust scrutiny.10 1 The Court reasoned that the statutory authority of
section 22(d) was not sufficiently broad to extend to dealers acting as
statutory brokers.10 2 Further, the court reasoned that the application
of antitrust rules was reconcilable with the goals of the Investment
Company Act and were, therefore, fully applicable to the case at
bar.10 3 However, the Court refused to apply antitrust laws to an
agreement between members of the National Association of Security
Dealers to regulate dealer and brokerage markets for the sale of mu-
tual funds.104 As in Gordon, the Court felt that the SEC was properly
charged with regulating the Association's rules and had maintained a
vigorous and continuous presence in the field of monitoring rules
within the purview of its regulatory authority.05 However, as the dis-
senting Justices noted, the Court never addressed the issue as to
96. See id. at 663-91.
97. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
98. See id. at 697.
99. See id. at 694.
100. See 15 U.S.C. §80a-22(d)(1994).
101. See Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. at 720.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 734-35.
105. See id. at 734. The four dissenting Justices were not so convinced. Justice White
opined that in the absence of clear immunization or exemption from antitrust
laws, private business agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny notwithstand-
ing the fact that another regulatory agency has the authority to regulate the con-
duct in question. See id. at 737-38 (White, J., dissenting).
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whether antitrust laws were plainly repugnant to the SEC's effectua-
tion of the rules and standards within its authority.06 The Court did
briefly note that the application of antitrust laws would subject indi-
viduals to "duplicative and inconsistent standards,1i0 7 but its analysis
was largely devoid of any explanation for why antitrust laws were ir-
reconcilably offensive to the SEC's duties under the relevant federal
legislation.10
IV. THE CURRENT TEST: DISCERNING COMMON THEMES IN
SILVER, GORDON AND SECURITIES DEALERS
How are Silver, Gordon, Securities Dealers and their progeny able
to be reconciled? Despite the Supreme Court's divergent holdings,
several common threads may be gleaned through its analysis. First,
antitrust laws are applicable to areas under the purview of the SEC if
they are not plainly repugnant to the effectuation of the particular
SEC enforcement policy. While the Court and subsequent federal
opinions have not laid a consistent foundation for what would consti-
tute plain repugnancy, it tends to focus on whether SEC regulations
would subject defendants to inconsistent standards if antitrust laws
are applied.
Thus, based on the Supreme Court's prior holdings, application of
antitrust laws to the market for corporate control would not be plainly
repugnant to the SEC's regulatory authority which is concerned only
with disclosure. However, the Supreme Court's reasoning is more mul-
tilayered. In each of the three cases in which antitrust laws either
were or were not applicable, the Court expressed an opinion, sup-
ported by extensive legislative history, determining whether the SEC
had done an adequate job in enforcing its regulations and curbing the
anticompetitive evils confronted in the facts before the Court.1 09
When the Court expressed satisfaction that the SEC was adequately
policing anticompetitive agreements or combinations within the pur-
view of its regulatory authority, it has consistently found antitrust
laws to conflict with the effectuation of some SEC policy. 1 0 In in-
stances in which the SEC had not acted affirmatively to curb anticom-
petitive abuses, the Court has been quick to apply antitrust law to the
facts before it.i"' In fact, the SEC's authority to control the manipula-
tion of tender offers is quite limited by the Securities and Exchange
106. See id. at 735-36 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 735.
108. See id.
109. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
110. See Gordon, 422 U.S. 659; Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694.
111. See Silver, 373 U.S. 341.
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Act.112 Thus, the situation in the market for corporate control more
closely resembles the fact scenario in Silver, in which the Supreme
Court refused to enjoin the application of antitrust laws while loudly
expressing its uneasiness over the SEC's impotence to enforce its
rules.
The nexus between the Supreme Court's constant focus on the
SEC's performance of curbing antitrust violations within its regula-
tory environment is striking because applying the Court's own test, it
should not matter whether the SEC has chosen to act in a given situa-
tion.' 1 3 If the SEC has the regulatory authority to supervise a given
activity and a stated policy which would conflict with antitrust laws,
of what relevance is the SEC's historical track record of supervision in
the field? Either antitrust laws are applicable or they are not, but the
SEC's advocacy in a given area should not be a relevant factor in de-
ciding whether antitrust laws can coexist with SEC regulation.
Thus, without stating so explicitly, the Supreme Court has demon-
strated a pattern of examining the SEC's regulatory and enforcement
performance in a given area in connection with determining whether
an antitrust cause of action is maintainable. The SEC's complete un-
willingness, either because it does not possess a statutory basis or out
of simple reluctance to regulate the manipulation of prices in the mar-
ket for corporate control, would militate in favor of applying antitrust
laws to unreasonable restraints of trade in that context.
V. DOES THE SALE OF STOCK FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW
OF "TRADE OR COMMERCE" UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT?
Some courts have refused to apply antitrust laws to securities
transactions because the sale of stock is "not an item of goods.""i4
Taking their cue from the Supreme Court's dicta in Apex Hosiery, sev-
eral courts have reasoned that since the sale of securities was not a
good or service, antitrust laws were inapplicable.
In Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.,ii5 the Third Circuit
expressly held that the sale of stock did not constitute a good or ser-
vice and was therefore not covered by the Sherman Act.ii 6 In con-
cluding that an antitrust cause of action was not maintainable, the
court reasoned that other federal security laws would "stand guard
over the excesses endemic to corporate takeovers.""i 7 Other courts
have similarly reasoned that the market for corporate control is not
112. See id.
113. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58(1911).
114. See infra notes 115-127 and accompanying text.
115. 769 F.2d 152 (31 Cir. 1985).
116. See id. at 156.
117. Id.
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subject to the application of antitrust laws because securities are
neither goods nor services.1 18
On a preliminary note, it is important to note that section 1 of the
Sherman Act is devoid of any reference to "goods and services."
Rather, it prohibits "[elvery contract, combination... or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce."1 1 9 The singular authority that the
sale of stock is neither a good nor a service is derived from the Su-
preme Court's determination that any alleged unreasonable restraint
of trade must involve "commercial competition in the marketing of
goods or services."1 20 Thus, Kalmanovitz and other courts have inter-
preted the Supreme Court's limitation on the Sherman Act's applica-
tion to only goods and services to exclude the sale of stock because it
does not comport with either category. This interpretation of the ap-
plicability of the Sherman Act to the sale of stock is misconstrued for
several reasons.
First, as stated above, the plain language of the Sherman Act con-
tains no mention of goods or services, but rather, speaks more broadly
to "trade or commerce."1 21 Reliance on the specialized analysis of the
Sherman Act in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, which was decided in the
context of segregating labor unions from mainstream commerce, is
misplaced.i 22 In fact, the correlative footnote qualifying Apex Ho-
siery's "goods and services" limitation clearly states that the Sherman
Act was meant to curb abusive restraints of trade in the broad area of
business competition.' 2 3 Second, the Supreme Court has considered
several cases in which antitrust laws were applied to intangible prop-
erty.1 2 4 If the Sherman Act's construction of "goods and services" were
as narrow as Kalmanovitz suggests, the Supreme Court would never
reach the larger issue with which it has grappled so extensively: the
118. See Bucher v. Shumway, 452 F. Supp. 1288, 1290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(holding that
securities are neither goods nor services).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
120. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940). The source for this confu-
sion stems from the Supreme Court's explanation of the policy underlying the
Sherman Act in Apex Hosiery. In rationalizing that the Sherman Act was de-
signed to prevent someone from "rais[ing] prices or otherwise control[ing] the
market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services,"
courts have assumed that antitrust laws are not applicable to the sale of stock
because it does not fit their particularized definition of "good or service." Id. at
493.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1(1994).
122. See Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. 469.
123. Id. at 493 n.15. 'The history of the Sherman Act... is emphatic in its support for
the conclusion that 'business competition' was the problem considered and that
the act was designed to prevent restraints of trade which had a significant effect
on such competition." Id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)(applying
antitrust laws to bank mergers).
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coexistence of antitrust laws with other federal regulations.125 Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court stated that entities should not be exempted
from liability under antitrust laws just because they may deal "in the
intangibles of credit and services rather than in the manufacture or
sale of tangible commodities."126 Other Supreme Court cases have
made clear that antitrust laws were applicable to agreements which
purported to restrain the price of commodities, which further strains
the context and application of Apex Hosiery's demarcation of the Sher-
man Act's limits.127
Finally, courts concluding that antitrust laws are outside the reach
of the sale of stock have done so without reasoning why securities are
not goods.128 A good may be defined restrictively, or it may "include
every species of personal property."1 29 Many courts have recognized
the defectiveness of various arguments in favor of excluding the sale of
stock from reaches of the Sherman Act and have refused to exempt
these sales from the scope of antitrust laws on such grounds.130
VI. THE IMPLIED REVOCATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT IN
THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
BY THE WILLIAMS ACT
The final argument frequently asserted for the proposition that an-
titrust laws are not enforceable in transactions involving the sale of
stock is that the Sherman Act has been impliedly repealed in cases
involving the application of the Williams Act.
The Williams Act was enacted in 1968 to provide shareholders who
are offered a cash tender offer for the ownership of their stock with
information and disclosure about the intentions and qualifications of
the offeror.131 Due to the increasing occurrences of cash tender offers,
125. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v.
National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321; Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
126. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 368.
127. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
128. See Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 769 F.2d 152, 156 (3rd Cir. 1985).
The court concluded that the sale of stock did not constitute a good, stating that
the sale of stock in the context of a takeover battle does not fall within Apex
Hosiery's definition of "good." Id. Kalmanovitz seemed swayed by the fact that
"other laws" would protect the abuses of corporate takeovers. Id. at 157-58.
129. BLAcies LAw DIcTIoNARY 822, 6' ed. (1990); see also Bozant v. Bank of New York,
156 F.2d 787, 790 (2 ,d Cir. 1946)(holding that "preparing, executing or validating
bonds, shares of stock, commercial paper... [or] bills of lading" constitutes the
production of goods).
130. See Rothberg v. National Banner Corp., 259 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Finne-
gan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 827 (2 nd Cir. 1990).
131. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); see also S. REP. No. 550-
2 (1967)(outlining the decisions confronting shareholders in the face of a tender
offer).
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Congress enacted the Williams Act to compel disclosure of the "back-
ground and identity" of the offeror, the source and quantity of funds
used to purchase the stock, the offeror's holdings in the target, and the
offeror's plans vis a vis the target corporation's business or struc-
ture. 13 2 Thus, the offering party must disclose adequate information
to both the target corporation and the SEC in order for investors to
gauge whether acceptance or rejection of the tender offer is in their
best respective interests. i 3 3 The Williams Act also governs rules sur-
rounding cash tender offers that afford shareholders certain protec-
tions, such as the ability to withdraw their shares for a period of time
following the commencement of the tender offer.134 Further, the Wil-
liams Act specified that the offeror must match any increase in its
original tender offer paid to subsequent shareholders to those share-
holders who had previously tendered their stock before the price in-
crease.i 35 The Williams Act also prohibits untrue and misleading
statements of fact or engaging in any "fraudulent, deceptive, or ma-
nipulative acts or practices" in connection with tender offers. 13 6
Thus, the Williams Act was designed to protect against three evils:
nondisclosure by tender offerors of adequate information enabling a
shareholder to make a reasonable decision to sell or keep his stock,
offeror overreaching in connection with tender offers, and fraudulent
and misleading statements. As discussed below, none of these policies
are inconsistent or plainly repugnant to the application of antitrust
laws because the Williams Act was designed to further a different pol-
icy than that of the Sherman Act.
In Finnegan v. Campeau Corp.,137 the Second Circuit refused to
apply antitrust laws to a collusive takeover agreement between two
bidders of a target company on the grounds that the Sherman Act con-
flicted with the policy of the Williams Act. 138 A shareholder of the
target company challenged the agreement, which reduced the
purchase price for the target company, as violative of antitrust
laws.' 3 9 The court held that Congress had impliedly revoked the ap-
plication of antitrust laws to securities transactions because they ir-
reconcilably conflicted with the Williams Act.140 The court reasoned
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)(1994).
133. The Williams Act was intended to close existing loopholes in federal securities
regulation. The Securities and Exchange Act regulated corporate takeover at-
tempts by proxy solicitation, but did not provide disclosure requirements for cash
tender offers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430
U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)(1994).
135. See U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7)(1994).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)(1994).
137. 915 F.2d 824 (2nd Cir. 1990).
138. See id. at 832.
139. See id. at 825.
140. See id. at 832.
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that antitrust laws were impliedly repealed because their application
would disrupt the SEC's regulatory power over agreements that are
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."i4i Finnegan reasoned that
the Williams Act provided shareholders with the remedy of disclosure,
and this remedy conflicted with the Sherman Act.14 2
Finnegan misapplies the Supreme Court's "plain repugnancy"
analysis by concluding that the remedy afforded under the Williams
Act, disclosure, so conflicts with the Sherman Act that antitrust laws
may not be applied. Finnegan further asserts that the SEC has the
authority to protect target shareholders from collusive bidding among
potential buyers because the Commission can prevent acts and prac-
tices that involve material misrepresentation and disclosure.143 How-
ever, this remedy is of little comfort to the shareholder who, having
received disclosure of the proposed transaction pursuant to the Wil-
liams Act, is powerless to halt the collusive bidding between large
shareholders to increase the market price of the company's stock and
thereby induce one bidder to opt out pursuant to an agreement with
the other winning stockholder.
It is important to note that Congress has never statutorily ex-
empted the Williams Act from antitrust application, nor does the leg-
islative history evince any intent to do so. Thus, any argument that
the Sherman Act would be impliedly repealed in its application to the
Williams Act would be because the former's operation is plainly repug-
nant to the effectuation of the Williams Act.' 44 The SEC is con-
strained from affecting antitrust laws pursuant to the terms of the
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(f) prohibits the SEC from expanding
its interpretation of securities laws when it imposes "a burden on com-
petition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of
the [Exchange Act]."145 This statutory limitation opens the door to
the concurrent application of antitrust and securities laws when the
two are not diametrically opposed to each another. Stated another
way, the SEC's authority to preempt the application of antitrust laws
is limited both by statute and by the Supreme Court's "plain repug-
nancy" test.
The SEC's limitations are not surprising when one compares the
underlying policy of the Williams Act to antitrust laws. The case of
collusion between two bidders designed to increase the sales price of
stock so one of them may take the company over is more often pre-
mised on an entrepreneurial motivation to control the market, rather
than a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative animus.
141. Id. at 831 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)).
142. See id. at 830-31.
143. See id.
144. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51(1963).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(f)(1994).
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Although the SEC may regulate manipulative acts and practices,
the Supreme Court has stated that Section 14(e) is designed only to
address disclosure, and that courts are strictly mandated to interpret
the term "manipulative" only as it pertains to disclosure, and not to
the fairness of the tender offer.1 4 6 Thus, the manipulation of the sale
price of stock by two rival bidders seeking corporate control is not
within the purview of the SEC's regulatory authority except to the ex-
tent that such manipulation involves a lack of disclosure. For exam-
ple, in common instances of collusive agreements for corporate control,
the acquiring company wants to take over the target company, pre-
sumably to run it, sell off its assets, or increase the company's going
concern value and sell it at a future date. The losing bidder is moti-
vated to increase the price that he would otherwise receive for his
stock, plus whatever the acquiring company is willing to offer in order
to prevent further escalation of the company's stock price, thereby
making it more expensive to obtain a controlling interest in the target
company. This scenario has nothing to do with disclosure issues or
procedural rules governing tender offers, which are the two areas cov-
ered under the Williams Act. Rather, the above hypothetical contem-
plates that two rival bidders would agree, either tacitly or expressly,
to fix a price for the target. There are no issues pertaining to disclo-
sure or tender offers that would offend the application of the Williams
Act. Rather, the issue is the ability of two entities to fix the purchase
price for a corporate takeover.
The reason for the incompatibility between the SEC's regulatory
authority over securities and the Sherman Act is easy to comprehend
in light of the genesis of the legislation of each body of substantive
law. Antitrust laws were designed to curtail unreasonable restraints
of trade. They arose as a response to monolithic companies that con-
trolled their particular industry as a result of their ability to predato-
rily price and otherwise restrict trade by setting high barriers of entry
which precluded startup companies from asserting any meaningful
challenge to the monopolist's dominance.' 4 7 Antitrust laws were also
developed to prevent unreasonable vertical and horizontal restraints
of trade by entities that possessed enough market power to dictate and
manipulate the scope of competition. The majority of the Supreme
Court cases surveyed resolving antitrust disputes do not analyze the
fraudulent intent or lack of disclosure surrounding an unreasonable
restraint of trade. Rather, the focus is on whether the restraint of
trade is unreasonable, either on aper se basis or in light of the various
146. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1985).
147. The Sherman Act was "enacted in an era of 'trusts' and of'combinations' of busi-
ness and of capital organized and directed to control of the market by suppression
of competition in the marketing of goods and services." Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1939).
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circumstances surrounding the restraint.1 48 Parties who, devoid of
any fraudulent intent, engage in an unreasonable restraint of trade in
order to gain a competitive economic advantage violate the Sherman
Act as much as they would if their intent were deceitful or mislead-
ing.1 49 In either case, the unreasonableness of the restraint of trade is
the evil which the Sherman Act attempts to correct, not the protection
of the marketplace from fraud.
By contrast, curbing excessive restraints of trade and monopolistic
businesses was never the intent of the securities regulations. Even a
cursory view of the implemented securities regulations show that dis-
closure and the prevention of fraud are the SEC's major objectives.
The primary regulatory concern of the SEC is to prevent fraudulent or
deceptive practices in the market for corporate control. Thus, the SEC
was neither empowered nor inclined to assert regulatory authority
over companies which engage in predatory pricing or otherwise unrea-
sonably restrain trade. The SEC has chosen to instead concentrate on
disclosure and the prevention of fraudulent and deceptive practices
governing securities transactions. This was the policy behind creation
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the Williams Act, and the
establishment of the SEC as the supervising regulatory authority in
the securities industry.
Thus, the conclusion that the Williams Act's remedy of disclosure
effectively precludes the application of antitrust laws is erroneous.
There is no plain repugnancy from allowing the plaintiff to assert
claims for relief pursuant to the Sherman Act and the SEC's power
which, in this case, is limited to situations involving non-disclosure,
deception, fraud and manipulation. Finnegan's argument that appli-
cation of antitrust laws "would discourage potential bidders from mak-
ing a tender offer"150 again misses the point that the application of the
Sherman Act is not plainly repugnant to the SEC's regulatory author-
ity to compel disclosure. It is therefore anomalous to compare the re-
spective policies of the Sherman Act and the SEC's regulations
because each policy is aimed at preventing a different, yet not incom-
patible, economic problem.
VII. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In an earlier workl 5 i, we developed a mathematical theory of collu-
sive bidding in hostile takeovers. This model highlights several im-
portant features of such collusive bidding. In particular, the model
considers (1) the effort to find a suitable takeover target, (2) the exter-
148. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
149. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc., v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556, 573-74 (1982).
150. Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 831 (1990).
151. See McAfee, supra note 15.
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nality created when a rival realizes, from an opening bid, that the tar-
get exists, and (3) the effect on share prices of the takeover attempt
and the possible collusion by the bidders thereafter. 152
The timing posited in the model is as follows. First, one firm opens
the bidding and starts the process.' 53 This is commonly known as
putting the target "into play," with the ultimate expectation that the
target will be acquired by someone. Second, the market reacts ration-
ally to the news of the first bid, often outbidding the initial offer on the
expectation that the final price will exceed the opening bid.'54 (The
model generates the rational market response, set by arbitrage.)
Third, another potential suitor considers the target.15 5 This suitor is
"awakened" by the initial offer, as if the first firm pointed out the
value of the target to the world. 15 6 The awakened potential bidder
can decide to outbid the going market price or not. Fourth, if a new
bidder does enter the fray, a cartel may form.' 5 7 We suppose that the
likelihood of a cartel forming is a number a.158 The parameter a is
intended to capture the financial incentives of forming a cartel along
with the problems (negotiation, trust, suspicion, personality conflicts,
etc.) that might hinder the cartel's formation. To consider the effect of
the policy of making such cartels illegal, we consider the effect of a
decrease in a. Finally, if a cartel does form, it is efficient about the
takeover (assigning the assets to the efficient holder) and splits the
proceeds, which generally involves a cash transfer from one of the bid-
ders to the other, i.e. a payoff to drop out of the bidding. If no cartel
forms, the bidding continues until only one firm is left standing.
This sequence of events seems to capture the salient aspect of take-
over cartels. In particular, it recognizes the market response to the
initial bid, and to a bid by a rival. It permits the initial bid to be sub-
mitted artificially high as a means of deterring a rival from entering
the fray. Finally, it allows for the policy experiment of changing the
likelihood of a cartel. The effect of making cartel bidding illegal is
tantamount to a decrease in a.
This model bifurcates into two models, depending on the process
that generates the initial takeover bid. In one version of the model,
the initial bid is a consequence of a fortuitous observation or chance
happening. That is, the takeover is initiated when a firm realizes, as
a byproduct of what it was doing anyway, that the target represents
value beyond the stock price. In this case, any proceeds from the take-
152. See id. at 457-66.
153. See id. at 458.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 459.
157. See id.
158. See id.
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over are windfall gains, and a change in the law on cartels will not
affect the rate of takeovers. In the second model, the initial bid comes
about by a search process, with firms searching for undervalued firms.
In this case, a reduction in a will tend to reduce the gains to searching
for targets, thus reducing the search intensity and reducing the likeli-
hood that the assets are bid up.
A large number of observations follow from the model. First, the
initial price of the target will exceed the value of the assets in the
current use, because the stock price should reflect the value of the as-
sets in the alternative use of a takeover, weighted by the likelihood
that such a takeover occurs. An initial offer has two major external
effects. First, it may wake a second firm up, thereby increasing value
to the second firm and to shareholders. Second, it puts the firm into
play, ruling out later suitors that don't currently exist. The second
effect is rather subtle and an example may serve to illustrate the is-
sue. The value of railroads fell dramatically in the 1960s. Some rail-
roads were disassembled and the railbed sold. Sale of railroads at
that time may have eliminated a railroad. Today, however, railroads
have a value that was not as important in the 1960s, ownership of the
right of way. In particular, rural railroads are useful for laying fiber
optic cable. Urban railroads are useful for light rail transportation.
Neither of these applications was apparent in the 1960s; sales at that
time would not reflect potential future uses. The premium of the
share value over the value of the current use offers a deterrent to
those who might put the assets to a low-value use; thereby holding out
for a high-value use. It is important to realize that this premium
serves a socially useful purpose: if the share price is too low, then the
asset may be put to an inefficiently low-value use. Similarly, were the
share price to be too high, efficient uses will be missed.
The opening bid by a suitor must exceed the current price, which
acts as a screen to prevent low-value takeovers. Moreover, the first
bidder will generally offer a premium over the going stock price. This
premium deters the subsequent bidder from entering the fray, by sig-
naling the first bidder's commitment to the takeover. This premium
was emphasized in the work of Fishman.159 The key insight is that
the firm signals how high it will go by its opening bid, which induces a
large opening bid by high-value bidders.160 Low-value bidders will of-
fer more modest bids, hoping that the second bidder doesn't value the
firm very much.16 1
The market reacts to the opening bid in a rational manner. In the
case of perfect collusion (a'l), the market price is just the opening bid.
159. Michael J. Fishman, A Theory of Pre-emptive Takeover Bidding, 19 R. AND J. OF
ECONOMICS 88 (1988).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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No subsequent bidders are deterred because any bidder can bid the
going price, hoping to be paid to go away. Generally the size of the
market reaction to an opening bid increases as the likelihood of collu-
sion, a, falls.
When is collusive bidding a good thing for existing shareholders?
Collusive bidding has two significant impacts. First, it tends to reduce
the price paid to shareholders, given that a takeover has already
started, because it eliminates the competition. Second, collusive bid-
ding tends to increase the rewards to finding undervalued firms, by
reducing the free-rider problem associated with subsequent bidders,
who may get the target without doing the work of searching.
In the case when initial bids are the result of an accident, an idio-
syncratic event, the second effect is absent, because there is no need to
reward searching. Thus, for windfall occurrences, existing sharehold-
ers benefit from a prohibition of collusive bidding. In the second
model, where a competitive search process generates the discovery of
undervalued assets, exactly the opposite is true: the free-rider prob-
lem dominates the analysis, because the first effect vanishes. The re-
wards for searching for targets are set to the cost of searching, and
any attempt to reduce those rewards by reducing the ability to collude
is felt in a reduction in searching; there are no profits to be squeezed
out of the initial bidder. Consequently, the first effect vanishes, and
only the second effect, collusion speeding the arrival of a bidder,
remains.
This analysis provides starkly different predictions depending on
the process generating the initial takeover. When the initial bidder is
created by an investment and there is a competitive market generat-
ing those investments, collusion is a good thing for shareholders, be-
cause it speeds up the takeover without changing the proceeds of the
takeover. Nevertheless, once the takeover process has started, ex-
isting shareholders would like to prohibit collusion. Collusion benefits
shareholders generally, by increasing the effort spent in finding un-
dervalued firms, but once that effort is spent, the owners of any partic-
ular firm would like to prohibit collusion by the suitors. In contrast,
when the bids are determined by a random process unaffected by the
possibility of collusion, collusion does not speed up the takeover, but
does reduce the payments to bidders, thereby driving down the ex ante
share price. In this case, shareholders are opposed to collusion, even
ex ante.
When the process generating bids is competitive, everyone in the
model agrees that the policy of permitting collusion is a good thing. In
contrast, when the process generating the initial bid is random and
not determined by suitor effort, the shareholders would like collusion
to be prohibited. But is the social interest maximizing the present
value of the gains from trade? This turns out to depend on how much
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discounting there is relative to the speed of arrival of potential suitors.
The reasoning is fairly subtle. Recall that the initial share price will
cause the rejection of potential suitors whose value is less than the
initial price; collusion helps to determine which deals are consum-
mated by affecting the initial share price. If interest rates are low, the
social cost of rejecting an existing suitor is low, because another will
come along relatively quickly. In this case, share prices should be
high, which requires low collusion. In contrast, when discounting is
high there is a great cost of a rejected offer, so the initial stock price
needs to be low, and collusion is an instrument to lower the stock
price. The difference between shareholder incentives and the gains
from trade arise because of windfalls captured by the second bidder,
whose profits are not reflected either in the stock price or the returns
to searching for targets. Because of these profits, the socially optimal
level of collusion is always at least as large as that maximizing the
shareholder value.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The economic model, then, is a less than wholehearted embrace of
the basic premise of the antitrust laws, i.e. that collusive bidding al-
ways reduces the price paid to the seller. Instead, we conclude that the
effect of collusive bidding is mixed depending upon the point at which
the collusion occurs. Collusion coming at the time of the initial bid
speeds the rate of the takeover without reducing the shareholder's
proceeds. By contrast, collusion occurring after the takeover process
has begun reduces the price paid to shareholders.
The economic consequences of collusion in the market for corporate
control falls short of an endorsement of the founding premise of the
antitrust laws, i.e. that collusive bidding is always harmful to the
seller. The results affirm, however, that once the takeover process has
occurred, collusion is harmful to the shareholder since it (1) decreases
the price paid and (2) diverts a portion of the price to someone other
than the shareholder/seller.
It is curious, then, that while collusive bidding is prosecuted in any
other arena, it is tacitly permitted in the market for corporate control.
This gap in enforcement is attributable to the resistance of the courts
to apply antitrust laws to the sale of securities combined with the in-
applicability of the securities laws to non-fraudulent collusive bidding.
In the frenzied mergers and acquisitions market, this promises to be a
boon for acquirers and a loss for shareholders.
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